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A COURT BETWEEN:

Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in
the British Columbia Court of Appeal

Douglas C. Harris1

M

“

r. Sanders, we enjoyed your interesting argument.”2 With
these final words the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
in a brief oral judgment of 28 January 1977, dismissed the
appeal of nine members of the Cowichan Tribes in R. v. Jack. The nine
had been convicted at trial for fishing during the closed season, the
latest altercation in almost a century of conflict over the fisheries on the
Cowichan River.3 Their legal argument, constructed around the terms of
British Columbia’s entry into Confederation and the history of fisheries
regulation in the former colony, deserved serious judicial consideration
from the three-justice bench, not platitude.4 However, in an era before
the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and in a
province that had long denied their existence, the claims re-emerged in
the 1960s and 1970s to a sceptical Court of Appeal – a subject of interest
but a novelty of uncertain legal consequence.
Claims to Aboriginal and treaty rights all but disappeared from
Canadian courts in the second quarter of the twentieth century. A 1927
amendment to the Indian Act, repealed in 1951, prohibited the raising
of funds to pursue land claims without leave from the Department
1

2

3

4

I thank ubc law student Keith Evans for his research assistance and Hamar Foster, Angus
Gunn, Cole Harris, John McLaren, Wes Pue, Graeme Wynn, and an anonymous reviewer
for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
R. v. Jack, [1977] B.C.J. No. 123 (28 January 1977) at para. 24. The comment is from Bull J.A. It
follows the oral judgment delivered for the court by Robertson J.A.
On the conflict over fisheries on the Cowichan River, see Douglas C. Harris, Fish, Law, and
Colonialism: The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2001) chap. 3.
The court ruled that its even more perfunctory decision in R. v. Point (1957), 22 W.W.R. 527,
denying the accused member of the Musqueam Nation recourse to the terms of union as a
defence against a charge for failing to file an income tax return, was binding. When R. v.
Jack, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294, [1979] 2 C.N.LR. 25, reached the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice
Laskin and Justice Dickson, in concurring judgments, upheld the fisheries convictions but
dismissed, in Justice Laskin’s words, the “narrow ground” of the bcca’s ruling.
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of Indian Affairs.5 The effect was to bar claims to Aboriginal rights,
with the result that these rights were largely unknown to the judiciary
in British Columbia when, in the 1960s, Aboriginal peoples and their
legal counsel began to reassert them in the courtroom. The constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982 dramatically
altered the legal landscape, drawing those rights into courtrooms where
they had seldom been heard and elevating the role of the judiciary in
defining the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian
state.6 Nowhere is this more true than in British Columbia, a province
largely devoid of treaties and where the issue of Aboriginal title remains
unresolved.
This article reviews the decisions of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal (bcca) in the area of Aboriginal and treaty rights and reflects
on the court’s role in defining the content of those rights. It turns first
to the two most important of the early cases to work their way through
the court – R. v. White and Bob7 and Calder v. British Columbia8 – and
to several other cases that reveal a court confident in its assumption that
Aboriginal rights had little bearing on the province. The decisions of
the court in the 1970s reflected and consolidated the status quo, at least
as regards Aboriginal rights and title. This would change in a series of
decisions from the court in the short decade following 1982, when it
began to infuse those rights with substantial legal effect. MacMillan
Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin (the Meares Island case)9 and R. v. Sparrow,10
in particular, mark the definitive end of an era when the claims of
Aboriginal peoples might give rise to a sense of moral obligation but no
legal consequence.
In the early 1990s a cluster of cases, including R. v. Van der Peet 11 and
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,12 worked their way through the bcca
5
6

7

8

9
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12

An Act to Amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1927, c. 32.
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11: “The
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized
and affirmed.”
R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.) [White and Bob
(B.C.C.A.) cited to D.L.R.].
Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64, 74 W.W.R. 481
(B.C.C.A.) [Calder (B.C.C.A.) cited to D.L.R.].
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 577, [1985] 2 C.N.L.R. 55 (B.C.C.A) [MacMillan Bloedel (B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
R. v. Sparrow, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 577, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 145, (B.C.C.A.) [Sparrow (B.C.C.A.)
cited to W.W.R.].
R. v. Van der Peet, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 459, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 221 (B.C.C.A.) [Van der Peet
(B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
R. v. Delgamuukw, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 470, [1993] 5 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.C.A.) [Delgamuukw
(B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
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to the Supreme Court of Canada (scc). These cases form cornerstones in
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, but a divided bcca had a muted role in
this foundation building. In recent years, rights and title cases have been
less to the fore, but the bcca has reframed the practice of Aboriginal
rights litigation through a diverse set of decisions on the relationship
between Aboriginal title and the province’s title registration system,
the obligations on the parties to consult, the circumstances in which
the courts are prepared to adjudicate a land claim, and the funding of
Aboriginal rights litigation. Ascribing an overarching approach in these
most recent cases to what has become an increasingly large and diverse
appellate bench is a difficult undertaking, but it is apparent that the
court is more comfortable defining the parameters of a process than in
determining the content of Aboriginal rights and title.
There are many ways to explore the growing prominence of Aboriginal
and treaty rights in British Columbia. An analysis of the decisions of a
single court, even the province’s highest court, can provide only the most
partial of explanations. Provincial courts of appeal are institutionally
confined, positioned between the trial courts that produce the record
of the case and, in the area of Aboriginal and treaty rights, an engaged
scc. Moreover, changes within the domestic legal system are only part
of a larger set of forces, the result of which is a much more enhanced
recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights than existed a generation
ago. Nonetheless, in the years following the constitutional entrenchment
of Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982, the bcca became one of the
prominent voices in their articulation. This article divulges that voice,
its early reticence, and the diverse strands within it, through an analysis
of the court’s decisions.
PRE-SECTION 35 ABORIGINAL AND
TREATY RIGHTS

James Douglas, the chief factor of the Hudson’s Bay Company (hbc) at
Fort Victoria, concluded a set of fourteen agreements with Aboriginal
peoples on Vancouver Island between 1850 and 1854. The written text
of each of the agreements was in the form of a land transfer, not a
formal treaty, and, a century after their making, these agreements were
unfamiliar parts of the legal or political landscape in British Columbia,
at least beyond the Aboriginal communities that were parties to them.
Thomas Berger, legal counsel for the Snuneymuxw (Nanaimo) in
R. v. White and Bob, the first treaty rights case to reach the bcca, recounts
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his surprise when Snuneymuxw elders told him that their people had
a treaty right to hunt.13 According to the text of the agreements, the
Snuneymuxw retained the “liberty to hunt over unoccupied land and to
carry on their fisheries as formerly.”14 However, to be effective as a defence
against charges of hunting out of season and without a licence, Berger
and the Snuneymuxw had to convince the bcca that the 1854 agreement
with James Douglas was a treaty. They retained the provincial archivist,
Willard Ireland, and Wilson Duff, the curator of anthropology at the
provincial museum in Victoria, as expert historian and anthropologist,
respectively.15 Berger also turned to a more distant set of legal documents,
including the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the 1823 decision of Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. McIntosh.16
These and other sources had been marshalled in what Hamar Foster has
described as the first campaign for Indian title, 1908-28, but a generation
had passed since they had been aired in British Columbia, and they had
never been presented to the bcca.17 Berger was leading the court into
legal terrain it had never before traversed.
The court split. Justices Sheppard and Lord concluded that the
agreements were merely land transfer agreements, Justices Davey and
Norris, in separate reasons, that the agreements were treaties. Justice
Sullivan concurred with Justice Davey. By a 3:2 margin the agreements
were treaties. In his reasons, Justice Norris set out a framework for the
interpretation of historic treaties between Aboriginal peoples and the
Canadian state that the scc would adopt in later cases:

13

14

15
16
17

Thomas Berger, One Man’s Justice: A Life in the Law (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2002)
88. On the changing nature and role of legal counsel in litigating Aboriginal and treaty rights
cases, see Douglas Sanders “Lawyers and Indians,” 17 January 2001 (unpublished).
The text of the Douglas treaties is reproduced in Papers Connected with the Indian Land
Question, 1850-1875, 1877 (Victoria: Queen’s Printers, 1987) 5-11. There is no text of the agreement
with the Snuneymuxw but, instead, a notation after the first thirteen agreements indicating
that the “Saalquun Tribe – Nanaimo” had made “a similar conveyance.”
See Wilson Duff, “The Fort Victoria Treaties,” BC Studies 3 (1969): 3-57.
Johnson v. McIntosh, (1823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543.
Hamar Foster, “We Are Not O’Meara’s Children: Law, Lawyers, and the First Campaign for
Aboriginal Title in British Columbia, 1908-28,” in Foster, Heather Raven and Jeremy Webber,
eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 61-84.
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The question is, in my respectful opinion, to be resolved not by the
application of rigid rules of construction without regard to the circumstances existing when the document was completed nor by the tests
of modern day draftsmanship. In determining what the intention of
parliament was at the time of enactment of sec. 87 of the Indian Act,
parliament is to be taken to have had in mind the common understanding of the parties to the document at the time it was executed. In
the section “treaty” is not a word of art and, in my respectful opinion,
it embraces all such engagements made by persons in authority as may
be brought within the term “the word of the white man,” the sanctity
of which was, at the time of British exploration and settlement, the
most important means of obtaining the goodwill and cooperation of the
native tribes and ensuring that the colonists would be protected from
death and destruction. On such assurance the Indians relied.18

Treaty interpretation was to be based on an attempt to discern
“common understanding,” not the Crown’s unilateral construction of
meaning and “not by the application of rigid rules of construction without
regard to the circumstances.” Moreover, Justice Norris continued, even
if the agreements were not treaties, the Snuneymuxw rights to hunt and
fish “still exist.”19 As a result, “this is not a case merely of making the
law applicable to native Indians as well as to white persons so that there
may be equality of treatment under the law, but of depriving Indians
of rights vested in them from time immemorial, which white persons
have not had, viz., the right to hunt out of season on unoccupied land for
food for themselves and their families.”20 In short, the rights preceded
the treaty, had been confirmed by it and by the Royal Proclamation, and
had not been extinguished. Justice Norris doubted that the colony or the
province could extinguish those rights; that power lay with the imperial
government and, after Confederation, with the federal government.21 In
sum, his was an exceedingly powerful statement about the continuing
legal salience of Aboriginal rights and title, particularly so from a judge
near the end of a prominent career in the province’s business community
and legal establishment.22 However, in 1964 Justice Norris stood alone
in this analysis. The scc would uphold the decision of the bcca in a
18

19
20
21
22

White and Bob (B.C.C.A.) at 648-49. The scc cited the first two sentences of this passage in
R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at para. 16, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127. See also para. 44.
Ibid. at 647.
Ibid. at 648.
Ibid. at 656-57.
See G.S. Cumming, Q.C., “Nos Disparus: The Honourable Thomas Grantham Norris, M.C.,
Q.C.,” The Advocate 35 (1977): 69-70.
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brief oral judgment but only on the ground that the agreements were
treaties.23 It would withhold comment on the nature of Aboriginal title
until Calder.
The issue of Aboriginal title was a long time in coming directly
before Canadian courts. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
had considered and defined its content as a “personal and usufructuary
right, dependent on the good will of the Sovereign” in the late nineteenth century case of St. Catharine’s Milling & Lumber Co.24 However,
that case revolved around a jurisdictional dispute between the federal
government and Ontario, not a claim of Aboriginal title. The Nisga’a
would be the first to bring an Aboriginal title claim when, in 1967, they
turned to the courts for a declaration that their Aboriginal title had not
been extinguished. They did not ask for a definition of that title or a
determination of its geographic scope but merely a declaration that their
title had not been extinguished. Such a declaration, they believed, would
then form the basis for treaty negotiations with Canada and the province.
Thomas Berger would argue the Nisga’a case from trial, through the
bcca, to the scc, and it was likely that his success in White and Bob was
the catalyst that brought the Nisga’a to court. However, as early as 1913
the Nisga’a had formulated the basis of their claim to Aboriginal title
in a petition that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declined
to entertain.25
The trial court heard expert archival and anthropological evidence
on the nature of Nisga’a use, ownership, and territorial control of their
lands, and on the history of Nisga’a interaction with government officials.26 The court also heard the testimony of five Nisga’a chiefs, including
Nisga’a Tribal Council president Frank Calder. They testified as to the
structure of Nisga’a society, Nisga’a relations with their neighbours, the
extent of Nisga’a territory, and to the fact that the Nisga’a had never surrendered their Aboriginal title to that territory.27 Douglas McK Brown,

23
24
25

26

27

R. v. White and Bob, [1965] S.C.R. vi, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481.
St. Catharine’s Milling & Lumber Co. v. R. (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54.
The petition is reproduced in Foster et al., Let Right Be Done, Appendix B, 241-45. See also
Foster, “We Are Not O’Meara’s Children.”
Berger turned again to Willard Ireland and Wilson Duff. See Wilson Duff, The Indian History
of British Columbia, vol. 1: The Impact of the White Man (Victoria: Royal British Columbia
Museum, 1969), written between his testimony in White and Bob and Calder.
The other chiefs to testify were James Gosnell of New Aiyansh, Maurice Nyce of Canyon
City, W.D. McKay of Greenville, and Anthony Robinson of Kincolith. For extensive excerpts
of the testimony, see the judgment of Hall J. in the scc. See also Berger, One Man’s Justice,
115-19.
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counsel for the province, did not challenge this evidence.28 He based
the province’s defence on two legal propositions: (1) that Aboriginal
title never existed in British Columbia but (2) that if it had, it had been
extinguished. It was a straightforward and honest legal statement of what
had long been provincial policy. The considerable challenge for Berger
and the Nisga’a was to demonstrate that the province was wrong in law,
a challenge compounded by the fact that such a finding would disrupt
deeply seated assumptions within the province about the inviolability
of the Crown’s title.
The trial judge ruled that, whatever the legal status of Aboriginal title
(he declined to make a determination), it had been extinguished. The
bcca went further: Aboriginal title did not exist. Chief Justice Davey
wrote that the Nisga’a “must establish that by prerogative or legislative
act, or by a course of dealing by the Crown from which a prerogative
act can be inferred, the Crown ensured to the Nishga Nation aboriginal
rights in the lands in question.”29 In short, Aboriginal title was a legal
interest only if the colonial state recognized it as such. Without a treaty
to establish the Crown’s recognition, the Nisga’a turned to the Royal
Proclamation of 1763, but Justices Tysoe and Maclean ruled that the imperial edict did not apply to British Columbia. Moreover, if Aboriginal
title did exist then the various colonial land ordinances and acts had
effectively, albeit implicitly, extinguished it. Justice Tysoe overcame the
lack of any express extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the legislative
record with the weight of statutes and ordinances – thirteen in all between
the creation of the mainland colony in 1858 and British Columbia’s entry
into Confederation in 1871 – in which the Crown asserted its title and
outlined the terms under which it would distribute interests in land.30
All three justices in Calder ignored the reasons of Justice Norris in White
and Bob, which to that point was the fullest examination of the status
of Aboriginal title. Instead, in language similar to the findings of the
trial court in the next Aboriginal title case, Delgamuukw, Chief Justice
Davey found that “they [the Nisga’a] were undoubtedly at the time of
settlement a very primitive people with few of the institutions of civilized
society, and none at all of our notions of private property.”31 The judgment
28

29
30
31

See “Frank Calder and Thomas Berger: A Conversation,” in Foster et al. eds., Let Right Be
Done, 43-44.
Calder (B.C.C.A.) at 67.
Ibid. at 87-94.
Ibid. at 66. In the scc, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, Hall J. would challenge Davey
C.J.B.C. directly on this point (p. 347), reproducing pages of testimony and evidence from
the trial to find, at page 375, that “the Nishgas in fact are and were from time immemorial a
distinctive cultural entity with concepts of ownership indigenous to their culture and capable
of articulation under the common law.”
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reflected provincial policy and broadly accepted public perceptions.
It has been ignored by subsequent courts but not by the province, which
claimed for more than another decade that the decision of the bcca on
Aboriginal title was binding, notwithstanding the scc decision that
was to follow.
The decision of the scc in Calder was either an exquisite piece of
judicial balancing or equivocation. The court split three, three, and one:
three that Aboriginal title existed but had been extinguished; three that
it existed and had not been extinguished; and one that the Nisga’a had
not secured the requisite permission from the province to bring a lawsuit
against the province. The three who found that Aboriginal title had been
extinguished concurred with the one who ruled on the procedural shortcoming and thus, in a four-to-three ruling, the scc denied the Nisga’a
appeal. However, six justices repudiated the lower court’s finding that
Aboriginal title did not exist, and three of those held that Aboriginal
title remained intact as a legal interest. This outcome prodded the federal
government to transform its Indian policy, establish a comprehensive
Indian land claims process, and enter treaty negotiations. In British
Columbia the provincial government maintained that, because the scc
had ruled against the Nisga’a on a technical ground, the judgment of
the bcca on Aboriginal title – that Aboriginal title did not exist, or,
that if it did, it had been extinguished – properly reflected the state of
the law.
The decisions of the bcca before the constitutional entrenchment of
Aboriginal and treaty rights reveal much about the nature of British
Columbia’s settler society and its relations with Aboriginal peoples. In
varying degrees, they reflect the attempts of that society to justify in
law its position of superiority and power in a colonial setting, while at
the same time beginning to come to terms with the consequences of the
colonial encounter and the processes of reconciliation. The judgments
of Justice Norris and, to a lesser extent, of Justice Davey in White and
Bob speak most clearly to the effort of reconciliation. Conversely, the
decisions of the court in Calder and then in Jack reflect the long and much
more broadly held perception that the colony and then the province of
British Columbia had managed its Aboriginal peoples full well without
the unhelpful intrusion of legal doctrines such as Aboriginal title and
rights, concepts that provincial officials believed were of dubious legal
pedigree and uncertain effect. Where the cases went to the scc, as many
of them did, the latter upheld the decisions of the bcca, dismissing the
Crown’s appeal in White and Bob and that of the Aboriginal appellants in
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the other cases. However, this tally of confirmations is misleading, particularly in Calder but also in Jack, where the scc justices were sketching
out a fundamentally different legal framework for relations between
Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state, while the bcca decisions
remained embedded in and sustained a set of legal and more broadly
cultural assumptions of Western superiority and entitlement.32
ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS
FOLLOWING s. 35

The lodging of Aboriginal and treaty rights within the Canadian
Constitution in 1982 presaged an enormous transformation in Canadian
law. Once viewed with scepticism, these rights now had constitutional
purchase, and four decisions from the bcca in the mid-late 1980s reveal
the effects of this elevated status. The first and last of these cases, R. v.
Bartleman33 and Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton Marina Ltd.,34 dealt,
respectively, with the hunting and fishing provisions in the Douglas
treaties. Two other cases decided within a year of each other, the Meares
Island case and Sparrow, illustrate even more clearly the early impact of
the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights and title.
In 1977, conservation officers charged Joseph Bartleman, a member of
the Tsartlip First Nation, for hunting deer with a prohibited cartridge.
Seven years later he appeared before the bcca pleading a treaty rights
defence based on the hunting provision in the Douglas treaties. After
White and Bob, there was no doubt that the 1852 agreement between
the Tsartlip and the hbc was a valid treaty. In this case Bartleman
had been hunting on private land outside the boundaries of the lands
described in the treaty. Did the treaty right to “hunt over unoccupied
land” extend beyond the described boundaries to include the traditional
hunting territory of the Tsartlip, and might “unoccupied land” include
private land? A unanimous bcca overturned the conviction of the trial
court;35 the treaty right to hunt extended throughout the traditional
hunting territory of the Tsartlip, and the private lands in question were
“unoccupied lands” within the meaning of the treaty. Justice Lambert,
32

33

34

35

See also the two decisions that the BCCA released on 28 February 1975: R. v. Derriksan, [1975]
4 W.W.R. 761, 9 C.N.L.C. 507 (B.C.C.A.); and R. v. Kruger, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 167, 9 C.N.L.C.
620 (B.C.C.A.).
R. v. Bartleman (1984), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 73, [1984] 3 C.N.L.R. 114 [Bartleman (B.C.C.A.) cited
to D.L.R.].
Saanichton Marina Ltd. v. Claxton, [1989] 5 W.W.R. 82, [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 46 (B.C.C.A.)
[Saanichton Marina (B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
R. v. Bartleman, [1981] 1 C.N.L.R. 83 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
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who wrote the central judgment, drew on emerging principles of treaty
interpretation that required not only a liberal interpretation of treaty
terms in favour of the Tsartlip but also that the treaties be interpreted
as they would have been understood by them.36 The decision provoked
controversy, although not so much for the conclusion or for the principles
of treaty interpretation that it reinforced as for Justice Lambert’s stepping
beyond the accustomed judicial role by collecting and reviewing historical
material that neither party had introduced in evidence.37 In a concurring
judgment that appeared designed to assuage concern, Justice Esson (with
Justice Carrothers) indicated that they agreed with Justice Lambert’s
interpretation of the treaty but had reached this conclusion without seeing
or relying on any of the material that had not been introduced at trial.
The bcca signalled in Bartleman that it would not construe Aboriginal
treaties in narrow, technical terms but, rather, that it would infuse the
slight text of the Douglas treaties with substantial meaning. However,
the court also ruled that treaty rights had their limits, particularly
where it perceived that public safety was an issue. R. v. Napoleon arose
when Saulteaux hunters, parties to Treaty 8, shot a deer within a “No
Shooting” zone adjacent to a public highway.38 The hunters argued that
the regulations were in conflict with the hunting rights in Treaty 8 and,
therefore, did not apply to them. Justice Taggart, writing for the court,
disagreed: the object of the regulations was “the protection of the public
from unsafe shooting” and to set “standards of safety expected of all
members of the public.”39 The bcca reiterated this position nearly two
decades later in the night hunting case of R. v. Morris and Olsen.40 Justices
Thackray and Huddart agreed with the trial judge that hunting at night
was “inherently dangerous,” and that the night hunting prohibition in the
Wildlife Act did not infringe or unjustifiably infringe the Douglas treaty
right to hunt.41 Justice Lambert, in dissent, held otherwise: “the true
meaning of the treaty is that safety is a matter for control by the Indian
peoples under their own laws, customs, traditions, and practices and not
by the unilateral non-consultative enactment of the largely non-Indian
36
37

38
39
40

41

Bartleman (B.C.C.A.) at 86-91.
See M.H. Ogilvie, “Case Notes: R. v. Bartleman,” Canadian Bar Review 64 (1986): 183-205,
and the rejoinder, P.B. Carter, “Do Courts Decide According to the Evidence?” UBC Law
Review 22 (1988): 351-67.
R. v. Napoleon, [1985] 6 W.W.R. 302, [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 86 (B.C.C.A.) [cited to W.W.R.].
Ibid. at 318.
R. v. Morris and Olsen, 2004 bcca 121. See also R. v. Seward (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 524, [1999]
3 C.N.L.R. 299.
Ibid. paras. 173-74, 212.
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people.”42 A majority of the scc would agree with Justice Lambert, at
least in so far as the general prohibition against night hunting was an
overly broad restriction of the treaty right to hunt.43
In the 1980s, the bcca would also interpret the right to “fisheries as
formerly” in the Douglas treaties as providing substantial protection
for traditional fishing territories. In Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton
Marina Ltd. the Tsawout turned to the courts to challenge a proposed
marina in Saanichton Bay that, if built, would occupy the fishing ground
in front of their village site and Indian reserve and would infringe their
treaty right. In a move that revealed the continuing opposition within the
province to the idea that the Douglas treaties might contain enforceable
rights, the Crown and company “pleaded emphatically” at trial that
the Douglas treaties, if indeed they were treaties, were not binding on
the Crown.44 It was an argument that Hamar Foster has described as
“not merely tenuous, but unworthy” of the Crown,45 and the trial judge
dismissed it in a preliminary motion.46 In the alternative, the Crown
argued that the “fisheries as formerly” provision secured nothing more
than the right of the Tsawout and other signatory tribes to participate in
the fisheries on the same terms as the public. The trial judge dismissed
this argument as well and ordered a stop to the marina. The bcca agreed.
Justice Hinkson, writing for a court that included Justices Lambert and
Locke, concluded that, while the “fisheries as formerly” provision “does
not amount to a proprietary interest in the sea bed nor a contractual right
to a fishing ground[,] it does protect the Indians against infringement
of their right to carry on the fishery, as they have done for centuries, in
the shelter of Saanichton Bay.”47 The effect of the treaty was “to afford
to the Indians an independent source of protection of their right to carry
on their fisheries as formerly.”48
British Columbia’s highest court was now telling the province,
through Bartleman and Saanichton Marina, that the hunting and fishing
provisions in the Douglas treaties conferred enforceable rights that did
more than simply guarantee Native peoples the right to participate
on the same terms as the non-Native public. The court’s rejection of
42
43
44

45

46
47
48

Ibid. para. 62.
R. v. Morris and Olsen, 2006 scc 59.
Saanichton Marina Ltd. v. Claxton, [1988] 1 W.W.R. 540 at 547-48, [1987] 4 C.N.L.R. 48 [Saanichton Marina (B.C.S.C.) cited to W.W.R.].
Hamar Foster, “The Saanichton Bay Marina Case: Imperial Law, Colonial History and
Competing Theories of Aboriginal Title,” UBC Law Review 23 (1989): 629-50 at 640.
Saanichton Marina (B.C.S.C.) Schedule 2 at 551-54.
Saanichton Marina (B.C.C.A.) at 93.
Ibid. at 94.
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provincial policy was even more striking in its decisions respecting
Aboriginal rights and title.
In Calder the scc had announced that Aboriginal title was an interest
of legal consequence. Whether it had been extinguished in British
Columbia remained to be resolved, as did the details of its content.
Initial answers began to appear in the 1980s, particularly in the bcca’s
decision regarding the Meares Island case. This case emerged from a
high-profile conflict between a logging company and the province on
the one hand, and environmentalists and Native peoples on the other,
over the logging of Meares Island. MacMillan Bloedel, to which the
province had granted timber rights on the island, planned to begin
logging; environmentalists sought to preserve the old-growth forest on
the island; and the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council (ntc) claimed the
island as an integral part of its traditional territory to which the Nuuchah-nulth held Aboriginal title. The case came before the courts in the
form of requests for injunctions, one from MacMillan Bloedel to stop
the protestors from blocking its access to the island, another from the
Clayoquot and Ahousaht (members of the ntc) to stop the company
from logging pending the resolution of the claim to Aboriginal title.
The chambers judge who heard the injunction requests held that
the claim of the Clayoquot and Ahousaht to Aboriginal title had no
prospect of success at trial and, further, that the claim had been too long
in coming. Moreover, if granted, the injunction would have “potentially
disastrous consequences” for the provincial economy, given the extent of
unresolved claims to Aboriginal title and the possibility that the grant
of an injunction in this case would set a precedent that would spread
across the province.49 In a split decision, the bcca disagreed. All the
justices found that the claim to Aboriginal title presented a fair question
or a serious issue to be tried. Calder was not, as the chambers judge had
held, “a complete answer to the assertion of aboriginal title.”50 Justice
Macfarlane, who concurred with Justices Seaton and Lambert in the
majority, suggested instead that “using the Calder case as a standard [for
determining the continued existence of Aboriginal title] the least that
can be said is that there is an even chance of success at trial.”51 Moreover,
the bcca dismissed the notion of undue delay. Justice Seaton put it this
way: “The Indians have pressed their land claims in various ways for
generations. The claims have not been dealt with and found invalid.
49
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MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 722 at 749, [1985] 2 C.N.L.R. 26, (B.C.S.C.)
[cited to W.W.R.].
Ibid. at 739.
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They have not been dealt with at all. Meanwhile, the logger continues
his steady march and the Indians see themselves retreating into a smaller
and smaller area.”52
Unified on the question of a serious issue to be tried, the bcca divided
on which of the parties would bear the larger burden if the injunction
were granted or denied. Justice Craig in dissent held that to permit the
logging would not cause “irreparable damage” to the Nuu-chah-nulth; if
they were eventually able to establish Aboriginal title over all or some part
of the island, compensation for damages would be a sufficient remedy.53
Justice Macdonald, also in dissent, echoed the concern of the chambers
judge that to grant the injunction would have “potentially disastrous
consequences” and would wreak “havoc” on the provincial economy.54
The dispute over logging on Meares Island, he suggested, was not unique,
and he was worried about the precedent it would set and the advantage
it would give Native peoples in future negotiations.55
Justice Seaton disagreed. Any damage to MacMillan Bloedel as
a result of an order to stop logging on Meares Island was minimal,
particularly when compared to the Nuu-chah-nulth loss if the logging
were to proceed and they were later able to establish Aboriginal title:
Meares Island is of importance to MacMillan Bloedel, but it cannot be
said that denying or postponing its right would cause irreparable harm.
If an injunction prevents MacMillan Bloedel from logging pending
the trial and it is decided that MacMillan Bloedel has the right to log,
the timber will still be there.
The position of the Indians is quite different. It appears that the area to
be logged will be wholly logged. The forest that the Indians know and
use will be permanently destroyed. The tree from which the bark was
partially stripped in 1642 may be cut down, middens may be destroyed,
fish traps damaged and canoe runs despoiled. Finally, the island’s
symbolic value will be gone. The subject matter of the trial will have
been destroyed before the rights are decided.56
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Justices Lambert and Macfarlane concurred, and the bcca ordered
MacMillan Bloedel to stop logging pending the outcome of the Nuuchah-nulth claim to Aboriginal title. It was an enormously important
decision that put the province on notice that resource extraction and
other activity that interfered with or had the potential to infringe Aboriginal title, even where that title was claimed but not yet established
or confirmed, would be subject to new limits.57 The bcca would return
to these issues twenty years later in Haida Nation v. British Columbia
(Minister of Forests).58
The decision of the bcca in R. v. Sparrow is hardly remembered. Such
is the fate of a decision that sits in the shadow of the scc decision that
established the basic framework for the interpretation of Aboriginal
rights. However, the 1986 decision of a unanimous court revealed the
extraordinary distance that the bcca had travelled over the emerging
terrain of Aboriginal rights in the decade since its decision in Jack.
In the early 1980s, in an effort to halt what it perceived to be the
illegal sale of salmon caught under a food-fishing licence, the federal
Department of Fisheries and Oceans imposed fishing net-length
restrictions, conducted a “sting” operation in which an undercover
officer posed as a fish buyer, and eventually raided the Musqueam
Indian Reserve seizing vehicles. Charges followed but were eventually
dismissed. The dispute festered, and in 1984 the federal department laid
charges against Ron Sparrow for fishing with a net that was too long.
The Musqueam raised an Aboriginal rights defence: their fishery had
priority subject only to valid conservation requirements. The trial judge
convicted Sparrow. In his estimation, the bcca decision in Calder was
binding, and therefore the Musqueam had no Aboriginal right to fish
or, if they did have a right, it had been extinguished by the Fisheries Act
and regulations. On appeal, the County Court judge concurred and held,
further, that s. 35 could not revive a right that had been extinguished
by regulation.
A unanimous bcca led by Chief Justice Nemetz disagreed. As a first
order of business, it buried the notion that its decision in Calder remained
a binding statement on the state of Aboriginal rights and title in British
Columbia.59 The Musqueam had fished on the Fraser River since time
immemorial, and this gave rise to an Aboriginal right to fish.60 Moreover,
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The scc refused leave to appeal. See MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, [1985] 5 W.W.R. lxiv.
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“the ‘extinguishment by regulation’ proposition has no merit.”61 Turning
to s. 35, the court held that the Aboriginal right to fish was now “entitled
to constitutional protection.”62 The result was that “the Indian food
fishery is given priority over the interests of other user groups” and that
the right “cannot be extinguished.”63 Thus, while the government could
restrict the Indian food fishery, it could only do so in a manner that “can
be reasonably justified as being necessary for the proper management
and conservation of the resource or in the public interest.”64 In this
case, the Crown had not discharged its burden of establishing that the
net-length restriction was necessary as a conservation measure and an
appropriate restriction on a constitutionally protected right. Finally, the
court defined the category of “food fishing” broadly: “‘food purposes’
should not be confined to subsistence. In particular, this is so because
the Musqueam tradition and culture involves a consumption of salmon
on ceremonial occasions and a broader use of fish than mere day to day
domestic consumption.”65 The bcca set aside the conviction and ordered
a new trial.
The bcca ruling in Sparrow was a remarkable decision from a unanimous
court that, only a few years earlier, had thoroughly dismissed the idea
of Aboriginal rights and title. In 1990, the scc upheld the result and the
basic framework of analysis adopted in the bcca; the s. 35 protection for
Aboriginal and treaty rights would not be reduced to a constitutional
afterthought. The Supreme Court also imposed stricter limits on the
Crown’s capacity to infringe a constitutional right. Conservation was a
valid objective that might justify infringing the right, and there might
be other valid objectives, such as the prevention of harm, but limiting
the right in the public interest, as the bcca had proposed, was “so vague
as to provide no meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable
as a test for the justification of a limitation on constitutional rights.”66
Apart from this pointed correction, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sparrow was a strong affirmation of the now largely forgotten decision
of the bcca.
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ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND TITLE
FOLLOWING SPARROW

In Sparrow and the Meares Island case, Aboriginal rights and title
were as much a part of the legal terrain of British Columbia as trees
and salmon were of its land and rivers. However, the detail of that
terrain remained undefined. The single greatest effort of any Canadian
court to describe that terrain came on 25 June 1993, when a five-panel
bench of the bcca released seven decisions regarding Aboriginal rights
to hunt and fish, 67 as well as its decision in the Aboriginal title case of
Delgamuukw. Most of the cases turned, first, on whether the Aboriginal
defendants could establish an Aboriginal right and, then, on whether
the Crown could justify its infringement of that right.68 All but the two
hunting rights cases would rise to the scc, and several – Van der Peet,
Gladstone, and Delgamuukw – would become central to the emerging
interpretation of s. 35. The effort of the bcca was monumental, but its
contributions in these seven cases to that interpretation were modest, a
function, in part, of preceding the scc in the cases that it would use to
define its approach to Aboriginal rights and title. However, it was also
a function of the fact that, unlike Sparrow where the court had spoken
with a single voice, in 1993 the bcca spoke with many and with little
unanimity. Nonetheless, a few echoes from the twenty-four judgments
of the five justices over the eight cases continue to reverberate in the
growing body of case law on Aboriginal and treaty rights. A summary
of the decisions appears in Table 1.
The two hunting rights cases – Alphonse and Dick – involved Aboriginal rights defences to charges under the provincial Wildlife Act, in
Alphonse for hunting out of season, in Dick for hunting without a permit.
Justice Macfarlane wrote for the majority in both cases, with Justice
Lambert writing separate, concurring reasons. Using the interpretative
framework established in Sparrow, the bcca acquitted the defendants
on the grounds that they were exercising an Aboriginal right to hunt,
that the Wildlife Act infringed that right, and that the government had
67
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R. v. Dick, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 446, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 63 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Alphonse, [1993] 5
W.W.R. 401, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 19 (B.C.C.A.); Van der Peet (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Gladstone, [1993]
5 W.W.R. 517, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 75 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 542,
[1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 158 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Nikal, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 629, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 117
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Lewis, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 608, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 98 (B.C.C.A.).
Aboriginal rights were an issue in every case except R. v. Lewis, which turned on the connection between the allotment of Indian reserves and the fisheries, something that was also
an issue in N.T.C. Smokehouse and Nikal. For an account of the connections between Indian
reserves and the fisheries, see Douglas C. Harris, Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves
and Rights to Fish in British Columbia, 1849-1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).
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Table 1

British Columbia Court of Appeal Decisions by Justice in the Aboriginal Rights and Title
Cases Released 25 June 1993. (Bold indicates that the justice authored a decision in the case.)
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R. v. Dick
Aboriginal Right?
Justifiably Infringed?
Results?

R. v. Alphonse
Aboriginal Right?
Justifiably Infringed?
Results?

R. v. Van der Peet
Aboriginal Right?
Justifiably Infringed?
Results?

Hutcheon

Macfarlane Wallace

The
Court

Taggart

R. v. Gladstone
Aboriginal Right?
Justifiably Infringed?
Results?

R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse
Aboriginal Right?
Justifiably Infringed?
Results?

R. v. Nikal
Aboriginal Right?
Justifiably Infringed?
Results?

R. v. Lewis
Fishing within Reserve?
Results?

Delgamuukw v. B.C.
Ownership?
Jurisdiction?
Results?
i

ii

no
no
dismiss

In Dick and Alphonse Lambert J.A. held that the regulations under the provincial Wildlife Act did
not apply to the defendants in the exercise of an Aboriginal right to hunt.
Macfarlane J.A. (Taggart J.A. and Wallace J.A. concurring) found no Aboriginal right but, in the
alternative, if there were a right, the Crown had justified any infringement.

no
no
dismiss

154

bc studies

failed to justify the infringement. These decisions, markedly different
from earlier cases that had resulted in convictions, revealed the powerful
influence of s. 35.69 It was becoming abundantly clear that the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights would affect the province’s
capacity to restrict and limit Native hunting. The Crown did not appeal
either case to the scc.
The fishing rights cases were more contentious. They put the question
of an Aboriginal right to a commercial fishery squarely before the court,
a question that the bcca and the scc had sidestepped in Sparrow. The
lead case in what became known as the Van der Peet trilogy involved
charges against Dorothy Van der Peet, a member of the Stó:lō Nation of
the lower Fraser River, for selling two salmon that had been caught under
a food fishing licence. Justice Macfarlane, with whom Justice Taggart
concurred, defined the case this way: “it is about an asserted Indian right
to sell fish allocated for food purposes on a commercial basis.”70 Similarly,
Justice Wallace asked whether the Stó:lō had an Aboriginal right “to sell
fish caught pursuant to a Food Fish licence?”71 Framed in these terms,
the court held that the Stó:lō had failed to establish an Aboriginal right
to sell fish caught for food purposes.72 It reached a similar conclusion in
Gladstone (Justice Macfarlane for the majority) and N.T.C. Smokehouse
(Justice Wallace for the majority, Justice Hutcheon concurring).
Justice Lambert was the sole dissenting voice that would have acquitted
the accused in each of the commercial fishing rights cases. Instead of
defining the claimed right in terms of the extent to which the activity that
gave rise to the charges deviated from the regulations (i.e., a right to sell
fish caught under a food fish licence), Justice Lambert characterized the
right as follows: “If the fishing for salmon was what defined the culture
of the society and made possible the cycle of the lives of its members,
then it would be possible to describe the aboriginal right as a right to live
from the salmon resource and to continue to make the salmon a focus of
69

70
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The earlier cases include R. v. Kruger, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 167, 9 C.N.L.C. 620 (B.C.C.A.); R.
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the sustainment of the lives of the people.”73 This was a characterization,
he claimed, that was “sensitive to the aboriginal perspective,” something
that the scc had prescribed in Sparrow.74 Justice Lambert then turned to a
series of US cases, primarily treaty fishing rights cases from Washington
State, for the proposition that the Aboriginal right to fish extended to
such fishing as was necessary to support a moderate livelihood.75 The
right, he concluded, extended to “self-regulation” of the fishery and to
a catch of “sufficient salmon to provide all the people who wish to be
personally engaged in the fishery, and their dependent families, when
coupled with other financial resources, with a moderate livelihood.”76 He
would extend this analysis to the Heiltsuk herring fishery in Gladstone
and the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht salmon fishery in N.T.C. Smokehouse,
acquitting the accused in each case.
The defendants appealed their convictions to the scc, which in turn
upheld the convictions in every case except Gladstone; William and
Donald Gladstone had established an Aboriginal right to a commercial
fishery. Following Justice Hutcheon’s approach in the bcca in Van der
Peet, the scc sent the Crown and the Gladstones back to the trial court
to hear more evidence on the Crown’s objectives in regulating the fishery
and whether the regulatory scheme for the herring fishery was a justifiable infringement of that right.77 However, Justice McLachlin on the
scc would adopt Lambert’s characterization of the right as conferring a
moderate livelihood, and, several years later, the scc would embed it in
the framework for the interpretation of historic treaty rights to fish in
R. v. Marshall.78 This, perhaps, marks the signal contribution from the
bcca to the emerging understanding of s. 35 in the hunting and fishing
rights cases.
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For an analysis of the links between the US cases and the development of Aboriginal and
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In Delgamuukw, the bcca had before it the controversy generated by
the decision of Chief Justice McEachern in the trial court. It was also
presented with a somewhat different case. At trial, the chief justice had
dismissed the claim of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en chiefs to ownership
and jurisdiction over their traditional territory, finding instead that the
plaintiffs held rights to their villages and non-exclusive Aboriginal rights
to use adjacent land for sustenance and ceremony but that these rights
had been extinguished by pre-Confederation colonial enactments – the
same thirteen land acts and ordinances that had been much debated in
Calder. In short, the colony had effected a “blanket extinguishment”
of Aboriginal title with its land legislation. However, a change in
the provincial government between trial and appeal brought about a
change in the province’s position. Instead of “blanket extinguishment,”
the province conceded that the plaintiffs held Aboriginal rights in the
claimed territory, or parts of it, but that these rights had been impaired or
infringed in some areas. Nonetheless, the basic issues of ownership and
jurisdiction, sometimes referred to in the bcca decision as Aboriginal
title and self-government, remained.79
All five justices agreed that the province had been right to concede
its claim of “blanket extinguishment”: the colonial legislation had not
extinguished Aboriginal rights, and subsequent provincial legislation
could not. However, they disagreed on the extent of those rights. Justice
Macfarlane found that the plaintiffs had “unextinguished non-exclusive
aboriginal rights, other than a right of ownership or a property right.”80
In a concurring decision, Justice Wallace found “a non-exclusive aboriginal right of traditional occupation.”81 They did not delineate the
content of the Aboriginal right, but it was less than a property interest
and they dismissed the plaintiffs claim to ownership. Similarly, both
justices concluded that whatever jurisdiction the plaintiffs might retain,
it could not impinge on federal or provincial power as divided under the
Constitution.82 Aside from the question of “blanket extinguishment,”
which the province had conceded before the appeal, the bcca upheld
the lower court’s decision.
Justice Lambert’s decision was substantially different. Inclined to search
broadly for guidance (the archives in Bartleman, the US Supreme Court
79
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Delgamuukw (B.C.C.A.) at para. 293.
Ibid. at para. 519.
Ibid. at paras. 171, 484. See the critique in Bruce Ryder, “Aboriginal Rights and Delgamuukw
v. The Queen,” Constitutional Forum 5 (1994): 43-48.

A Court Between

157

in the Van der Peet trilogy), in Delgamuukw Justice Lambert turned to
the recent decision of the Australian High Court in Mabo v. Queensland
and its ruling that “native title” was an entitlement “as against the whole
world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands.”83 It
was, in short, a property interest. Adopting this interpretation, Justice
Lambert ruled that the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en held “exclusive” or
“shared-exclusive” Aboriginal title over the lands they had occupied
exclusively or in combination with other Aboriginal peoples when the
British asserted sovereignty in 1846.84 They also held “a right to harvest,
manage and conserve the lands and their resources” as well as “a right
to maintain and develop their institutions for the regulation of their
aboriginal title” – that is, a right of self-government or self-regulation.85
The plaintiffs and the province were to negotiate the precise boundaries
of Aboriginal title land and the division of jurisdiction that would accompany self-government, but failing successful negotiations, either
party could return to court, and Justice Lambert sent the case back to
trial. Justice Hutcheon concurred, and so, four years and an unsuccessful
round of negotiations later, would the scc.86 Canada’s highest court
deferred the question of self-government but held that Aboriginal title
was an interest in land, one that was based on exclusive possession in 1846
and that amounted to exclusive possession in contemporary Canada.
ABORIGINAL LAW AND PRACTICE

Aboriginal peoples and occasionally the Crown have turned to the
courts to help structure the processes of litigation and negotiation
over Aboriginal rights and title, and here perhaps the bcca has had
its greatest influence in recent years. It has ruled on the relationship
between Aboriginal title and the title registration system, and on the
duty of the Crown to consult Aboriginal peoples where Aboriginal
title is claimed but not yet proven. It has also established guidelines
regarding when a claim to Aboriginal title can be litigated and the
circumstances in which the Crown is obliged to support the litigation
costs of an Aboriginal plaintiff or defendant.
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In separate decisions, the first involving a preliminary motion in
Delgamuukw, 87 the other a dispute over a proposed development near
Kamloops,88 the bcaa disallowed the attempts of Aboriginal plaintiffs
to register a certificate of pending litigation in the land title system
against fee simple interests on land to which they claimed Aboriginal
title. If they had been successful, the effect of registering a certificate of
pending litigation would have been to freeze further transfers of the fee
simple interest until the resolution of the Aboriginal title claim. However,
Justice Southin ruled in Skeetchestn that the province had never intended
Aboriginal title to be a registerable interest when it created the title
registration system and, therefore, that private interests in land would
remain unencumbered by a claim to Aboriginal title.
In 2002, as the BC Treaty Process laboured without results, Aboriginal
title litigation seemed interminable, and the provincial government
continued to act as though a claim to Aboriginal title presented little or
no burden on the Crown’s title, Justices Rowles and Huddart determined
that the province had a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples before
authorizing a project, in this case a mine, that could adversely affect
their interests.89 Less than a month later, a unanimous three-panel bench
of the bcca led by Justice Lambert ruled in Haida Nation v. British
Columbia (Minister of Forests) that the Crown and a large multinational
logging company had a duty to consult and to accommodate Aboriginal
peoples in circumstances where the Crown permitted and the company
undertook activity that could infringe Aboriginal title should that title
ever be established.90 In other words, the duty to consult and accommodate extended to land where title was claimed but not proven. The scc
would pull back a little on these decisions, overturning the decision in
Taku River Tlingit on the basis that there had been adequate consultation
and, in Haida Nation, restricting the duty to consult and accommodate
to the Crown.91 Nonetheless, the bcca had fundamentally reshaped
the legal landscape in a province where virtually all land not included
within a treaty is subject to a claim of Aboriginal title. In effect, the
court had pronounced that Aboriginal peoples were to be a part of any
future development within their territory, and the scc concurred.
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Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 scc
74; Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 scc 73.

A Court Between

159

Finally, two decisions from Justice Newbury in 2000 and 2001 have the
potential to determine the shape of future Aboriginal rights litigation.
In Cheslatta Carrier Nation v. British Columbia the plaintiffs sought a
declaration that they had an Aboriginal right to fish. The chambers
judge dismissed the motion for failing to disclose a cause of action,
and Justice Newbury, writing for a three-panel bench on the Court of
Appeal, agreed. The issue of Aboriginal rights should only be litigated,
she held, where there was a “live controversy” or a dispute to be resolved;
the court would not consider a motion for a declaration in the absence of
a dispute.92 The full effect of this judgment is yet to be felt, but it is likely
to confirm the existing pattern that Aboriginal rights claims appear most
commonly in court in response to the prosecution of a regulatory offence,
usually relating to hunting or fishing, where there is clearly a “real difficulty” for the court to resolve.93 Conversely, a civil lawsuit to establish
Aboriginal rights has become more difficult. However, if Cheslatta made
it more difficult for Aboriginal litigants to get to court, one year later, in
another unanimous decision authored by Justice Newbury, the court ruled
that the Aboriginal litigants in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v.
Okanagan Indian Band were entitled to costs in advance of the decision
on the merits.94 The dispute involved the applicability of the provincial
Forest Practices Code on land to which the Okanagan claimed Aboriginal
title, a dispute of considerable public interest involving “exceptional or
unique circumstances,” wrote Justice Newbury, that the Okanagan were
otherwise unable to fund.95 Within a month of this decision and citing it
in support, the British Columbia Supreme Court made an interim costs
order to require that the Crown help the Tsilhquot’in to fund their land
claims litigation.96 The scc would confirm these orders when it upheld
the bcca’s decision in Okanagan,97 and since then other First Nations
have successfully secured similar arrangements.98
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Cheslatta Carrier Nation v. British Columbia, 2000 bcca 539 at paras. 16-18.
Ibid. at para. 17. For an early example of the effect of this ruling see Nemaiah Valley Indian
Band v. Riverside Forest Products Ltd., 2003 bcsc 249.
British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2001 bcca 647.
Ibid. at para. 39.
Xeni Gwet’in First Nations v. British Columbia, 2001 bcsc 1641.
British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 scc 71.
Hagwiliget Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs), 2008 FC 574. Although see the
subsequent decision in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2008
bcca 107, to sever the Aboriginal title component of the case, thereby greatly reducing the
importance of the costs order.
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A COURT BETWEEN

Provincial courts of appeal sit between trial courts, which produce the
evidentiary record, and the scc, the court of final appeal. From this
middle perch, they oversee the trial courts but, in turn, are overseen
by the Supreme Court. They supervise but are subject to supervision,
and their capacity to supervise is determined, in part, by the degree
to which they are supervised. If the statements of provincial courts
of appeal are frequently countermanded or simply reconsidered, even
if not altered, their capacity to shape the development of the law
diminishes. Conversely, if the oversight is infrequent, the statements of
the provincial courts of appeal assume greater importance. In his study
of the relationship between the Supreme Court and provincial courts of
appeal, Peter McCormick suggests that “each Supreme Court decision
is a message that it is trying to send down the hierarchy to the ultimate
consumers, the trial courts and the parties that appear before them,
and the appeal process is the way that the Supreme Court oversees the
transmission of this message, reinforcing or fine-tuning it on subsequent
occasions.”99 The more the scc intervenes the more it diminishes the
importance of the provincial courts of appeal, which play the same role
as the scc but lower in the court hierarchy.
The scc’s readiness to grant requests for leave to appeal is one measure
of its willingness to intervene. By that measure, the scc has been exceptionally interventionist in Aboriginal law cases emerging from British
Columbia. Table 2 lists by decade the number of bcca decisions in the
Canadian Native Law Reporter (cnlr) since it began reporting in 1979,
the number of requests for leave to appeal that emerged from those cases,
and the number of times the Supreme Court granted leave. Of the 115
decisions from the bcca in the cnlr over this period, one or more of
the parties sought leave to appeal in 52 (45 percent) of them. Of these 52
applications, the scc granted leave in 28 (54 percent). The percentages
are somewhat higher in the middle decade, the ten years when s. 35
litigation first appeared in the scc, and somewhat lower in the decade
just concluded. But all the numbers are high when compared against
the general success rate of applications for leave to appeal from British
Columbia (21 percent) and from the country as a whole (16 percent) over
approximately the same period.100 Before 1979, leave was sought and the
99
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Peter McCormick, “The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Analysis
of Appeals from Provincial Courts of Appeal, 1949-1990,” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 3
(1992): 1-28 at 28.
The two sets of data do not correspond exactly. The C.N.L.R., source for bcca decisions in
the area of Aboriginal law, begins reporting in 1979. The Supreme Court Law Review reporting
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Table 2

Leave to Appeal from British Columbia Court of Appeal to Supreme Court of Canada
Average success
bcca
Leave to
scc
Success rate rate of all leave
decisions appeal
granted of leave to
to appeal
reported to scc
to leave
appeal
applications to scci
in cnlr requested of appeal applications
British Canada
Columbia
no.
no.
no.
%
%
%

Years

1979-1988

33

12

6

50

n/a

21

1989-1998

45

20

12

60

23

16

1999-2008

38

20

10

50

19

12

Total

116

52

28

54

21

16

i

Average success rates for leave to appeal applications are derived from statistics produced annually in
the Supreme Court Law Review. The first set appears in S.I. Bushnell, “Leave to Appeal Applications:
The 1984-85 Term,” Supreme Court Law Review 8 (1986): 383, and includes rates at which the scc granted
leave back to the 1981-82 term. The scc defines a term as 1 September to 31 August. The Supreme Court
Law Review includes rates at which the scc grants leaves to appeal by province beginning in the 1988-89
term. Because of these differences, the line for 1979-88 indicates the rate at which the scc granted leaves
to appeal from 1981-82 to 1987-88; the line for 1989-1998 indicates the rate from 1988-89 to 1998-99; and the
line for 1999-2008 indicates the rate from 1998-99 to 2007-08.

scc granted leave in almost every Aboriginal and treaty rights case
heard in the bcca.101
These figures suggest that the scc’s oversight of the bcca is significantly greater in the area of Aboriginal law than in other areas
of the law. This may not be unique to British Columbia; the success
rate for leave to appeal from other provincial courts of appeal may be
similarly high in Aboriginal law cases. However, as a large number of
the most important cases have emerged from British Columbia, the
scc appears to have been particularly active in its review of decisions
from that province. The constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal
and treaty rights probably explains much of the scc’s involvement. This
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on the rate at which the scc grants leaves to appeal begins in 1981-82. See the notes to Table 1
for details of the sources and differences.
The scc granted leave in White and Bob (1965), Calder (1973), R. v. Derriksan (1976), R. v. Kruger
and Manuel (1977), and R. v. Jack (1979).
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fundamental reshaping of the legal terrain required direction from
the country’s highest court. But that explanation does not account for
the scc’s oversight before 1982, and it probably does not explain all of
it afterwards.
When Aboriginal and treaty rights re-emerged in the 1960s and 1970s
from Indian Act-imposed exile, they did so tentatively and gradually
as judges struggled to understand rights that had not been articulated
in Canadian courtrooms for half a century. In these early years, as
Aboriginal and treaty rights cases came sporadically and then with
increasing frequency before the bcca, the court declined to engage
with the substance of the claims. With the exception of White and Bob,
where the court infused agreements between Aboriginal peoples on
Vancouver Island and the hbc with treaty status, Aboriginal peoples
did not find a hospitable reception for their claims in BC courtrooms.
The bcca’s dismissal of the Nisga’a claim to Aboriginal title in Calder
was more representative of the court’s work as well as of the views of the
larger society. Successive provincial governments denied the existence
or relevance of Aboriginal title in Canada’s westernmost province.
However, the scc’s decision in Calder set the country on another track,
one that led, in 1982, to the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal
and treaty rights – “the riveting of these provisions within Canada’s legal
framework.”102 This heightened the prominence of Aboriginal and treaty
rights, and elevated the role of the courts as arbiters between Aboriginal
peoples and the Canadian state. Attempts to assert Aboriginal rights no
longer had to be dressed in the garb of federalism and the jurisdictional
straying of provincial governments. Instead, claims of Aboriginal title,
of rights to fish and hunt, and of self-government could be put directly
to the courts, and treaty rights were taken more seriously in light of their
newly acquired constitutional status.
When these claims reached the bcca in the mid 1980s, they encountered a court now prepared to listen. In a remarkable series of decisions, including Bartleman and Saanichton Marina on treaty rights, the
Meares Island case on Aboriginal title, and Sparrow on fishing rights,
the court put itself at the forefront of an extraordinary transformation in
Canadian law. At a national level these decisions helped to establish the
foundation on which constitutional rights would be interpreted. Within
the province, they pushed the provincial government to admit, in 1990,
102
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Bar Review 80 (2001): 15-41 at 18.

A Court Between

163

that it had a responsibility to join the federal government in negotiations
with Aboriginal peoples over the unresolved issue of Aboriginal title.
With this period of initial activism behind it and the British Columbia
Treaty Process underway, the court issued a much more ambiguous set
of rulings in 1993. A divided court would provide limited recognition of
Aboriginal rights and a constrained understanding of Aboriginal title.
In the same series of cases the scc would establish the basic frameworks
in which Aboriginal rights and title were to be determined. In this
process, the bcca contributed relatively little. However, the tide turned
again in the early twenty-first century when the court delivered a series
of influential albeit mixed decisions that, while not ruling directly on
an Aboriginal rights or title claim, structure the way in which those
claims are litigated or negotiated.
Justice Lambert deserves particular mention. His twenty-five years
on the bcca spanned the turbulent decades following the constitutional
entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and he, more than any
other judge on the court, was at the centre of this rapidly developing area
of law. Writing for or with the majority in the 1980s, offering a strongly
dissenting voice in the 1990s, and then frequently with the majority in
his last few years on the court, Justice Lambert authored a remarkable
body of jurisprudence.103 Sometimes the scc reined in his rulings, as in
Haida Nation by limiting the duty to consult and accommodate to the
Crown, but more often than not it confirmed his basic approach. No
other BC judge exceeds his contribution to the emerging understanding
of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada.
In its engagement with Aboriginal and treaty rights, the record of
the bcca is as mixed as that of the larger society, which struggles to
live justly in a place settled by one group of peoples and then resettled
by others. The scc has been an active intervener, certainly, because of
the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights, but
perhaps also out of a sense, particularly in the early years when Aboriginal peoples and their legal counsel began returning to the courts,
that Aboriginal rights and title had not always had their due in British
Columbia. The federal government had long disputed the province’s
refusal to recognize Aboriginal title, and perhaps the difference of
opinion in political circles informed judicial approaches as well. Much
has changed in the province and in its highest court, even as the
103

Louise Mandel, who appeared many times before Justice Lambert, counted twenty-three
Aboriginal law judgments from Justice Lambert. See “Honouring a Brave Jurist: The Lambert
Tribute,” The Advocate 64 (2006): 207-16.
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efforts to co-exist in a shared territory continue. Sometimes maligned,
sometimes lauded, the Court of Appeal’s contributions in the field of
Aboriginal law are varied but undeniable, and, given the struggle that
continues in British Columbia over the recognition of rights and title,
the institution will almost certainly continue to play a central role,
from its middle perch in the court system, in the unfolding relationship
between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state. In this sense as
well, the British Columbia Court of Appeal is, or must aspire to be, a
court between.

